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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RIGHT-TO-COUNSEL
VIOLATIONS THAT OCCUR AT
SENTENCING: THE RULE OF AUTOMATIC
REVERSAL AND THE DOCTRINE OF
HARMLESS ERROR
MICHAEL DUVALLI

INTRODUCTION

After his conviction for multiple drug and firearm offenses,
Tommie Crawford faced a statutory-minimum sentence of fifteen
years' imprisonment. 2 Prior to his sentencing hearing, Crawford
informed the district court that he wished to waive his right to
counsel and moved to proceed pro se.3 The court granted Crawford's request and allowed him to proceed at sentencing without
the assistance of counsel. 4 At the conclusion of the sentencing
hearing, the court sentenced Crawford to the minimum term of
imprisonment.5 On appeal, Crawford successfully argued that his
waiver of counsel had not been knowing and intelligent; 6 therefore, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated.7
1 Michael Duvall is an associate at Bryan Cave LLP in Saint. Louis, Missouri. The author is formerly a judicial law clerk to the Honorable Pasco M. Bowman, II, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The views presented in this article are solely those of the
author and do not reflect the views of Bryan Cave, Judge Bowman, or the Eighth Circuit.
The author did not participate in the consideration of any cases discussed in this article,
including those in which Judge Bowman sat on the panel.
2 U.S. v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1101, 1103 (8th Cir. 2007).
3aId.
4 Id. at 1104.
5Id.
6 See Faretta v. Cal., 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
464-65 (1938)); see also infra notes 50-70 and accompanying text.
Crawford, 487 F.3d at 1106-07 (finding that the lower court record did not provide
sufficient indication that defendant understood the possible consequences of a decision to
forgo the aid of counsel).
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While Crawford succeeded in challenging the validity of his
waiver, he faced another obstacle to obtaining a new sentencing
hearing. The rule of automatic reversal provides that the denial
of a defendant's right to counsel throughout trial warrants a reversal of the conviction and a remand for a new trial.8 In the sentencing context, courts have consistently remanded for resentencing where a defendant was denied the right to counsel at the
sentencing hearing. 9 But in the situation where a trial court
merely imposes a statutory-minimum sentence 10 after a defendant was denied the right to counsel at sentencing, it is difficult
to imagine how a resentencing hearing could result in a better
outcome for the defendant. In that situation, a remand would
seem an exercise in form over substance.1"
Crawford presented that precise situation. Facing a confluence
of constitutional rights, federal sentencing rules, and institutional concerns, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit had a choice. The court could have concluded that
the rule of automatic reversal dictated a reversal per se on account of the court's inherent inability to quantify the prejudice
Crawford suffered from the denial of counsel. Alternatively, the
court could have acknowledged the futility of remanding Crawford's case for resentencing in light of the certain result prescribed by the mandatory minimum statute. The latter option
would necessarily involve a consideration of harmless-error review.
The unique circumstances of Crawford's case highlight several
tensions inherent in the law: efficiency versus comprehensiveness, form versus substance, and judicial economy versus the appearance of fairness. In the context of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, courts have frequently drawn a bright line in favor of comprehensiveness, form, and the appearance of fairness
8 See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629-30 (1993) (stating that the absence of
counsel for a criminal defendant is a defect affecting the entire trial framework, rather
than simply harmless error in the trial process itself (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499
U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991))); see also infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 95-165 and accompanying text.
10 In federal court, a sentencing judge has no authority to sentence a defendant below
the statutory minimum sentence unless the government files a motion on account of the
defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person or
the defendant qualifies for safety-valve relief. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)-(f) (West 2000); see
also Melendez v. U.S., 518 U.S. 120, 124 (1996).
11See Crawford, 487 F.3d at 1107.
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by refusing to review invalid waivers of counsel for harmless error and instead remanding without further inquiry for new proceedings. Crawford's case illustrates that this approach (the rule
of automatic reversal), while almost always appropriate, may not
fit all cases.
This article considers the limited applicability, if any, of harmless-error review to Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel violations
resulting from invalid waivers that occur at sentencing. Part
One traces the development of the constitutional guarantee of the
right to counsel, the corollary right to proceed pro se, and the corresponding requirements for waiving the right to counsel. Part
Two outlines judicial review of Sixth Amendment violations and
the doctrine of harmless-error review. Part Three discusses the
application of these doctrines to sentencing cases. Part Four addresses whether harmless-error review is ever appropriate for
right-to-counsel violations in light of this jurisprudence.
Throughout this article, Crawford serves as a catalyst for discussion.
I. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. The Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment provides, "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence." 12 This amendment has been broadly interpreted to require that any criminal defendant facing the possibility of imprisonment be provided counsel, at the state's expense if necessary. 13 Though this right is now entrenched as a
bedrock principle of our criminal justice system, such expansive
protection did not always exist. At the time of the ratification of
the Bill of Rights, the Sixth Amendment was simply understood
12U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13 See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2000) (reinforcing by statute a criminal defendant's right to
court-appointed counsel by requiring each U.S. district court to implement a plan for
"furnishing representation for any person financially unable to obtain adequate representation"); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (explaining that persons charged
with a crime who are unable to afford a lawyer will have one provided); FED. R. CRIM. P.
44(a) ("A defendant who is unable to obtain counsel is entitled to have counsel appointed
to represent the defendant at every stage of the proceeding from initial appearance
through appeal, unless the defendant waives that right."); see also Ala. v. Shelton, 535
U.S. 654, 672 (2000); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1972).
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to permit a criminal defendant to hire his 14 own counsel, which
was contrary to the English rule generally forbidding counsel in
criminal cases. 15 The Supreme Court began to expand the right to
counsel, however, through the Fourteenth Amendment Due
7 where the Court held
Process Clause' 6 in Powell v. Alabama,1
that in the circumstances of that case-the defendants, who were
facing capital charges, were unable to procure their own lawyer
and were unable to meaningfully defend themselves-the trial
8
court was required to appoint counsel to ensure a fair hearing.'
Later, the Court significantly expanded the right to counsel and
"construed [the Sixth Amendment] to mean that in federal courts
counsel must be provided for defendants unable to employ counsel."'19 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel was made applica20
ble to the states through the Due Process Clause.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies in cases in
which a defendant is subject to the possibility of incarceration,
including non-felony offenses. 2' The right attaches "at or after the
time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against [a defendant] - 'whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information, or arraignment."'2 2 A criminal defendant
23
enjoys this right during "critical stages" of the criminal process,
14Throughout this article, when referring to a criminal defendant, the terms "he," "his,"
etc. are used. This gender-specific language is used on account of the reality that men are
overwhelmingly more likely than women to commit criminal offenses. Women only represented 12% of convicted inmates in jail in 2002. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report: Profile of Jail Inmates (2002), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs
/crimoff.htm#data (last visited March 5, 2008).
15See U.S. v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 306-07 (1973); Powell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932);
David A. Moran, Don't Worry, I'll Be Right Back: Temporary Absences of Counsel During
Criminal Trials and the Rule of Automatic Reversal, 85 NEB. L. REV. 186, 190 (2006).
16 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the U.S.; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
17 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
isId. at 71.

19Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1938)).
20 Id. at 342 (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) and holding that the right
to counsel applies to the states through the Due Process Clause).
21 See Ala. v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 672 (2000) (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25, 37-38 (1972)).
22 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (quoting Kirby v. Ill., 406 U.S. 682, 689
(1972)).
23 Hamilton v. Ala., 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961). "Critical stages" are those "where the results might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality."
U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967). Earlier the Supreme Court had stated in passing
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including interrogation, 24 arraignment, 25 indictment, 26 information,27 plea hearings, 28 lineups, 29 confrontations, 30 psychiatric
evaluations in capital cases, 3 1 preliminary hearings, 32 trial,3 3 sen35
tencing, 34 and appeal.
While the right to counsel has been made applicable to nearly
all stages of the criminal process, the standard of performance
guaranteed by this right is very minimal. It is true that the right
to counsel refers not merely to a physically present attorney but
to "effective assistance of counsel," 36 yet counsel is deemed inefthat "the need for such assistance [of counsel] may exist at every stage of the prosecution,
from arraignment to sentencing." Carter v. Ill., 329 U.S. 173, 174 (1946). And even prior
to Carter,the Court stated that a defendant "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step of the proceedings against him." Powell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (emphasis
added); see also Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 463.
24 Mich. v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 632 (1986); Massiah v. U.S., 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
25 White v. Md., 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (per curiam); see Hamilton, 368 U.S. at 54 (noting that a defendant has a right to counsel during arraignment).
26Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689 (stating that the right to counsel extends beyond the trial itself and to the defendant's indictment).
27 Id. (clarifying that the right to counsel includes points of criminal proceedings beyond
trial, including information).
28 Iowa v. Tarver, 541 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (stating defendant has Constitutional right to
counsel at plea hearing stage of criminal process, as this stage is critical).
29 See U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967) (finding that pretrial lineup stage is of
such critical nature that defendant's right to counsel at this stage is equivalent to such
established right at the trial stage).
30 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298 (1967) (concluding that confrontation stage is also
critical stage at which the right to counsel is guaranteed), abrogated in part on other
grounds by Griffith v. Ky., 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
31 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 470-71 (1981). The Court in Estelle noted, however,
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not require that the defendant's attorney
actually be present during a psychiatric evaluation - on account of the nature of such
meetings -but that the right does require the opportunity to consult with counsel prior to
the evaluation. Id. at 471 n.14.
32 See Coleman v. Ala., 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (determining preliminary hearing stage
of State's criminal process is critical one in which a defendant has right to counsel).
33 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963) (holding adversarial system of
criminal justice demands right to counsel during trial for those charged with crimes, in
order to assure fair trials).
- See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967) (explaining sentencing nature is considered critical in criminal cases and therefore right to counsel applies); see also Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948) (specifying that absence of counsel in sentencing
violated criminal defendant's due process rights).
35 See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 483 (2000) (citing Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.
75, 88 (1988)) (asserting denial of counsel at appeal stage is presumptively prejudicial);
see also Douglas v. Cal., 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963) (positing appeal stage denial of
counsel acts effectively as economic status based distinction and is unconstitutional).
36 See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (citing Reece v. Ga., 350
U.S. 85, 90 (1955); Avery v. Ala., 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940); Powell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45, 57
(1932)) (highlighting long-standing recognition that criminal defendant's right to counsel
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fective only if counsel's performance falls below the reasonableness standard as determined by prevailing professional norms
37
and the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant's case.
The right to effective counsel has not necessarily translated into
the right to competent counsel on account of the prejudice
38
prong.
B. The Right to Proceed Pro Se
Conversely, American law has long-recognized the right of a
criminal defendant to represent himself. Prior to the ratification
of the Bill of Rights, parties were guaranteed the right to proceed
pro se in federal courts by the Judiciary Act of 1789. 39 It was also
the practice of the English legal system, as well as the colonial
legal system, to permit self-representation. 40 Moreover, most
states have traditionally recognized this right. 41 By 1948, the
right of a defendant to "conduct[] his own defense at the trial"
was a "recognized privilege." 42 Therefore, when the Supreme
Court was confronted with the question of whether the right to
self-representation was protected under the Sixth Amendment, it
acknowledged the "nearly universal conviction, on the part of our
people as well as our courts, that forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to defend himself
43
if he truly wants to do so."
Accordingly, in Faretta, the Court solidified the right to selfrepresentation as a "fundamental" part of American constitutional law. 44 The Court determined that the collection of rights
impliedly incorporates right to effective assistance of counsel); cf. supra note 31 and accompanying text (exploring exception where physical presence of counsel during psychiatric evaluation is not Constitutionally required).
37 Strickland v. Wash., 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).
3 See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Dreaming of Effective Assistance: The Awakening
of Cronic's Call to Presume Prejudice From RepresentationalAbsence, 76 TEMP. L. REV.
827, 882 (2003) (discussing the effect of the Strickland ineffective-assistance standard on
Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel claims).
39 Farettav. Cal., 422 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1975). Today this right is codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1654 (West 2000), which provides, "[iln all courts of the U.S. the parties may plead and
conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein."
40 Faretta,422 U.S. at 818.
41 See id. at 813-14 n.9-11.
42 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
43 Faretta,422 U.S. at 817.
4Id.
at 817-18.
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embodied in the Sixth Amendment, including the rights to information, confrontation, and compulsory process, "necessarily implied" the right to self-representation. 45 The Court emphasized
that the right to self-representation was "independently found in
the structure and history of the constitutional text," as opposed
to merely arising from the ability to waive the assistance of counsel. 46 This right exists at trial, 47 and although the Supreme Court
has not specifically considered the issue, the courts of appeal
have assumed that the right to proceed pro se applies at sentencing as well. 48 The Court in Faretta therefore made clear that a
criminal defendant possesses two conflicting rights: the right to
the assistance of counsel and the right to proceed pro se.49 Thus,
after Faretta, a workable standard was necessary to determine
how a defendant could effectively choose between these two
rights.
C. Waiver of the Right to Counsel
As the right-to-counsel jurisprudence developed, so did the corresponding notion that a criminal defendant may waive that
right in order to exercise his right to self-representation. In
1938, the Supreme Court stated, "The Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power
and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he
has or waives the assistance of counsel. ' 50 Four years later in Ad45Id. at 819.

46 Id. at 819 n.15 (finding that the Sixth Amendment implies the right to selfrepresentation).
47See id. at 819-20. A trial court may appoint standby counsel, however, who, in turn,
may participate in the proceedings, even over the defendant's protestations, so long as the
participation does not "seriously undermine" the "appearance before the jury" of the defendant's exercise of self-representation. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 187 (1984);
see also infra notes 50-70 and accompanying text.
48 See, e.g., Lopez v. Thompson, 202 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 883 (2000); U.S. v. Marks, 38 F.3d 1009, 1015 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
514 U.S. 1067 (1995); Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1007 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1110 (1991). The right to proceed pro se does not apply on appeal, however. Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 163 (2000).
49See Faretta,422 U.S. at 832 (arguing that the Framers of the Constitution, colonists,
and their English ancestors recognized the right to self-representation as equal to the
right to assistance of counsel).
60Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (emphasis added), abrogated in part on
other grounds by Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). The Court defined "waiver" as
"anintentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Id. at 464.
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ams v. United States ex rel McCann,51 the Court stated that the
right to counsel embodied a "correlative right to dispense with a
lawyer's help,"' 52 and that "the Constitution does not force a law-

53
yer upon a defendant."
In order to exercise his right to self-representation, a criminal
defendant "necessarily must waive his [S]ixth [A] mendment right
to counsel." 54 This is not an easy task, as courts have traditionally .'induldge[d] every reasonable presumption against waiver of
55
fundamental constitutional rights," such as the right to counsel.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has mandated that a valid
waiver of the right to counsel be made "'knowingly and intelli56
gently."'
Whether a knowing and intelligent wavier has occurred is determined by the facts and circumstances of each case, including
the background, experience, and conduct of the defendant.57 Trial
judges are advised to question the defendant about these circumstances even if the defendant states that he is informed of his
right to counsel. 58 Indeed, in a plurality opinion written over a
quarter-century before Faretta, Justice Black stated, "A judge
can make certain that an accused's professed waiver of counsel is
understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating and
comprehensive examination of all the circumstances under which
such a plea is tendered." 59 Specifically, trial judges should consider: whether the defendant understands the nature of the
charges against him; the statutory offenses involved; the applica51317 U.S. 269 (1942).
52 Id.

at 279.
See Moore v. Mich., 355 U.S. 155, 161 (1957) ("The constitutional right, of course,
does not justify forcing counsel upon an accused who wants none."); Carter v. Ill., 329 U.S.
173, 174-75 (1946) ("Under appropriate circumstances the Constitution requires that
counsel be tendered; it does not require that under all circumstances counsel be forced
upon a defendant.").
5 Bruce A. McGovern, Note, Invalid Waivers of Counsel As Harmless Errors: Judicial
Economy or a Return to Betts v. Brady?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 431, 431 (1987); see Faretta,
422 U.S. at 834-35; Strozier v. Newsome, 871 F.2d 995, 997 (11th Cir. 1989); Brown v.
Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607, 610 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) ("The right of self-representation
entails a waiver of the right to counsel, since a defendant obviously cannot enjoy both
rights at trial.").
55Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464 (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937);
Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882)).
56 Faretta,422 U.S. at 835 (quoting Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464-65).
57 Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464.
58 Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948).
53 Id.;

59 Id.
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ble range of punishments; potential defenses and mitigating factors; and "all other facts essential to a broad understanding of
the whole matter."60 These questions are not mandatory, however, as a valid waiver may occur without reference to all of these
factors. 61 But, "[a]n on-the-record colloquy exploring the dangers
of self-representation is recognized as the preferred method of
substantiating a waiver's validity. '62 If no colloquy is conducted,
a reviewing court may examine the entire record to determine if
'the defendant knew and understood the disadvantages of selfrepresentation,' 63 and that he "'had the required knowledge [to
represent himself] from other sources [than an attorney] ."'64
Even after a trial court is convinced that a defendant has
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel and can
therefore proceed pro se, the court may terminate the defendant's
self-representation if the defendant "deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct." 65 Additionally, the court may
appoint "standby counsel" to assist the defendant or represent
66
the defendant if self-representation is terminated.

60Id. The Benchbook for U.S. District Court Judges advises district judges to ask a defendant requesting to proceed pro se several questions concerning the defendant's understanding of the law, charges, penalties, sentencing guidelines, rules of evidence, and rules
of criminal procedure; his experience in self-representation; and the voluntariness of his
wavier. BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES (Federal Judicial Center, 4th ed.
1996), at 4-5. District judges are also advised to warn the defendant that the decision to
proceed without counsel is "unwise" and to "strongly urge" the defendant not to represent
himself. Id. at 5.
61 U.S. v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1101, 1106 (8th Cir. 2007) (explaining how court will uphold waiver of defendant's right to counsel as knowing and intelligent if either "(1) the
district court adequately warns the defendant about the dangers and disadvantages of
proceeding pro se or (2) the record as a whole demonstrates 'that the defendant knew and
understood the disadvantages of self-representation"' (quoting U.S. v. Stewart, 20 F.3d
911, 917 (8th Cir. 1994))).
62 Id. In Crawford, the court stated that previous cases indicated that the court favored
'a specific warning on the record of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation'
when a defendant seeks to proceed pro se." Id. (quoting Meyer v. Sargent, 854 F.2d 1110,
1114 (8th Cir. 1988)). See BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES, supra note 60,
at 4 (stating that where a criminal defendant wishes to proceed pro se, the district court
must "make clear on the record that defendant is fully aware of the hazards and disadvantages of self-representation").
63 Crawford, 473 F.3d at 1106 (quoting Stewart, 20 F.3d at 917).
64Id. (quoting U.S. v. Yagow, 953 F.2d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
833 (1992)).
65 Faretta v. Cal., 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975) (citing Ill. v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337
(1970)).
66

Id.
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A trial court's dilemma in considering whether to allow a defendant to proceed pro se is that the defendant may later challenge the validity of his waiver. If a waiver was not knowing and
intelligent, not only should the defendant have been prevented
from representing himself, but he also will have been denied his
right to counsel. 67 If a defendant who lost at trial claims on appeal that his waiver was invalid, an appellate court must consider whether a right-to-counsel violation has occurred and if so,
how to remedy that violation.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND REMEDY OF SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTTO-COUNSEL VIOLATIONS

In reviewing a challenge to a defendant's purported waiver of
counsel, a court of appeals must reexamine de novo whether the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. 68 If the trial court did not conduct a colloquy to establish a
valid waiver and the record as a whole fails to demonstrate a
knowing and intelligent waiver, then a violation of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel has occurred for which the court
must fashion an appropriate remedy. Since the right to counsel
is a fundamental right, 69 reversal has often been considered the
only appropriate remedy for a violation of that right. 70 The doctrine of harmless error, however, raises questions about the appropriateness of that response in certain circumstances.
A. StructuralDefect and the Rule of Automatic Reversal
The Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that if a defendant is deprived of his right to counsel at trial, a reversal and
remand for a new trial are required. 71 In fashioning this rule of
automatic reversal, the Court has distinguished "trial error[s],"
67 See, e.g., Strozier v. Newsome, 871 F.2d 995, 997 (11th Cir. 1989) ("[I]f [the trial
judge] allows a defendant his right to proceed pro se, he runs the risk that he may have
denied the defendant his right to counsel.").
68 See, e.g., U.S. v. Mahasin, 442 F.3d 687, 691 (8th Cir. 2006).
69 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963).
70 See Chapman v. Cal., 386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8 (1967) (citing Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (1963))
(noting that constitutional rights treated as harmless error require reversal).
71 See Ariz. v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-09 (1991); see also U.S. v. DominguezBenitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81 (2004); U.S. v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 n.2 (2002); Tyler v. Cain,
533 U.S. 656, 665-67 (2001); Neder v. U.S., 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999); Cal. v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 5
(1996) (per curiam).
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which "occur during the presentation of the case to the jury,"
from "structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism."72 The former are subject to harmless-error analysis, 73 but
the latter "require[ ] automatic reversal of the conviction because
they infect the entire trial process." 74 The Court has specifically
identified the deprivation of the right to counsel at trial as a
structural defect that requires automatic reversal of the convic6
tion 75 and that is not subject to harmless-error analysis.7 Similarly, in the context of ineffective-assistance claims, the Court
has stated that the denial of the assistance of counsel is pre77
sumed prejudicial to the defendant.
The Court has stated that the rule of automatic reversal is
necessary because the effect of Sixth Amendment violations that
"pervade the entire proceeding," such as the denial of counsel at
trial, are too "speculative" to quantify in terms of harm.7 8 And
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 81-94 and accompanying text.
74 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629-30 (1993) (citing Fulminante, 499 U.S. at
309-10).
75 Id. See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986), abrogated by Brecht, 507 U.S. 619; see
also Del. v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) (reaffirming the principle that valid
convictions should not be set aside if the reviewing court can say, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the constitutional error was harmless).
76 See Chapman v. Cal., 386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963)); see also Rose, 478 at 577. Twenty-one years prior to Chapman, the Court considered whether a defendant who had been represented by an attorney with a conflict of interest in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should automatically receive a
new trial. Glasser v. U.S., 315 U.S. 60 (1942). The Court stated, "The right to have the
assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice
calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial." Id. at 76. The Court
has also identified the deprivation of the choice of one's counsel, U.S. v. Gonzalez-Lopez,
126 S. Ct. 2557, 2564 (2006), the deprivation of the right to self-representation, McKaskle
v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984), and the deprivation of counsel on appeal, Penson
v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 89 (1988), as errors that are not subject to harmless-error review.
Also, in Holloway v. Ark., 435 U.S. 475, 490-91 (1978), a conflict of interest throughout
entire proceeding was not subject to harmless-error review, and in Hamilton v. Ala., 368
U.S. 52, 53 (1961), the absence of counsel at arraignment was not subject to harmlesserror review. But see infra note 78 and accompanying text.
7 Strickland v. Wash., 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984); U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-59
n.25 (1984). A defendant who successfully exercises his right to proceed pro se cannot
later claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, however. Faretta v. Cal.,
422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975).
78 Satterwhite v. Tex., 486 U.S. 249, 256 (1988) (citations omitted); see Buchanan v. Ky.,
493 U.S. 402, 425 n.21 (1987) (pointing to use of psychological evaluation at trial in noncapital case); Moore v. Ill., 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977) (citing to the admission of identification testimony from post-indictment lineup); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372
(1972) (pointing to the admission of confession in violation of Massiah v. U.S., 377 U.S.
201 (1964)).
72

73
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since an invalid waiver of counsel results in a total deprivation of
79 that violacounsel throughout the remainder of the proceeding,
80
reversal.
tion triggers the rule of automatic
Implicit in this rule is the rejection of the argument that considerations of judicial economy warrant a contrary approach,
such as the application of harmless-error review. But while the
Court has prescribed a strict rule of reversal for cases involving
the deprivation of counsel at trial, competing considerations
could arguably produce different results at other stages of trial,
including the sentencing stage.
B. Harmless-ErrorReview
In contrast to the rule of automatic reversal for structural errors, harmless-error review examines the quantitative effect of
trial errors in the context of other evidence to determine whether
reversal is appropriate.8 1 The Supreme Court has justified this
rule as one that "promotes public respect for the criminal process
by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on
the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error."8 2 The
Court has stated more directly that a criminal defendant has a
right to "a fair trial, not a perfect one,"8 3 as "there can be no such
84
thing as an error-free, perfect trial."
The federal harmless-error statute provides, "On the hearing of
any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give
judgment after an examination of the record without regard to
errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties." 8 5 This rule triggers a two-step process on direct review.
First, the reviewing court determines whether the challenged

79 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.

80 See Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 256.
81 See Ariz. v. Fulminante,499 U.S. 279, 307-08 (1991).
82 Del. v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986).
3Id.
84 U.S. v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09 (1983).
85 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (West 2007). Additionally, Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides, "Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded." FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). This rule is intended to provide the standard of appellate review in criminal cases. 28 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 652.02 (3d ed. 2007).
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ruling was in fact erroneous.8 6 Second, the court determines
8 7
whether the error affected the defendant's substantial rights.
To determine whether the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, the court must categorize the error. If the error
did not involve a constitutional right, it is deemed harmless
unless it had a "substantial or injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict" or it leaves the court in "grave
doubt" as to whether it had that effect.88 Stated another way, "If,
when all is said and done, the [court's] conviction is sure that the
error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the
verdict and the judgment should stand."8 9 If the error involved a
constitutional right, a more exacting standard is used, and reversal is required unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 90
Some constitutional errors, however, cannot be analyzed under
the harmless-error framework because they "cast so much doubt
on the fairness of the trial process that, as a matter of law, they
can never be considered harmless." 91 These constitutional errors
are the structural errors that require automatic reversal. 92 The
Court has identified "Sixth Amendment violations that pervade
the entire proceeding" as errors incapable of review for harmless
error. 93 Accordingly, the total deprivation of the right to counsel
at trial has been identified as a structural error requiring auto94
matic reversal.
C. The Tension
The rule of automatic reversal for right-to-counsel violations at
trial and the doctrine of harmless-error review provide conflicting
86

See, e.g., U.S. v. Uder, 98 F.3d 1039, 1043 (8th Cir. 1996).

87

See MOORE ET AL., supra note 85,

88 Kotteakos

652.03.

v. U.S., 328 U.S. 750, 765, 776 (1946).
89 Id. at 764-65.
90 Chapman v. Cal., 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). On collateral review of a state-court criminal judgment, however, the Chapman harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard does
not apply to constitutional errors; rather, the Kotteakos standard for non-constitutional
errors applies. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 622 (1993). This less exacting standard applies on collateral review even if the state court did not review the error under the
Chapman standard. Fry v. Pliler, 127 S. Ct. 2321, 2328 (2007).
91Satterwhite v. Tex., 486 U.S. 249, 256 (1988).
92 See Ariz. v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-10 (1991); see also supra notes 81-94 and
accompanying text.
93 Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 256.
94 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8; see supra notes 12-38 and accompanying text.
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guidance for courts considering a case such as Crawford. The
Supreme Court has consistently stated that reversal is the only
appropriate remedy for a violation of the right to counsel at trial,
but the Court has not specifically considered the situation where
a right-to-counsel deprivation occurs at sentencing. In a case
where a remand for re-sentencing could not possibly result in a
more favorable disposition for the defendant, a strict rule of
automatic reversal would seemingly waste judicial resources. In
this rare situation, a court must consider the impact of both the
rule of automatic reversal and the doctrine of harmless error.
III. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT SENTENCING
These doctrines-the right to counsel, the right to selfrepresentation, waiver of the right to counsel, structural error,
and harmless error-can simultaneously be implicated by a defendant at sentencing. A criminal defendant unquestionably has
the right to counsel at sentencing, 95 and he may waive this right
and proceed pro se.96 Courts have analyzed waivers of the right to
counsel at sentencing in somewhat less exacting fashion than
waivers made during trial, however, generally allowing the
waiver colloquy at sentencing to be less "exhaustive and search97
ing [than] a similar inquiry before the conclusion of trial."
Courts have taken this approach because trials have historically
98
been considered more complicated than sentencing.
Nonetheless, a trial court's decision to allow a defendant to
proceed pro se at sentencing must be supported by an on-therecord colloquy or by the record as a whole. 99 What is required of
95 See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967) (explaining that courts have been veering towards the application of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at sentencing as well
as during trial); see also Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 739 (1948) (noting that courts
now recognize a due process violation in the absence of counsel since it can "result ... in
the prisoner actually being taken advantage of, or prejudiced .... ).
9 See, e.g., U.S. v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1101, 1105 (8th Cir. 2007).
91U.S. v. Salemo, 61 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1001 (1995).
98But see U.S. v. Smith, 997 F.2d 396, 398 (8th Cir. 1993) (Gibson, J., concurring)
("[t]he guidelines ... have created a complex hyper technical system consuming great
amounts of judicial time for both trial and appellate judges."). Compare U.S. v. Day, 998
F.2d 622, 626 (8th Cir. 1993) ("Sentencing hearings demand much less specialized knowledge than trials .... ") with Salemo, 61 F.3d at 219-20 (agreeing that sentencing hearings
require less specialized knowledge than trials but also cautioning that sentencing is "often
times [a] complicated part of the criminal process").
99 See supra 95-98 and accompanying text; see also Salemo, 61 F.3d at 219 ("This distinction [between trial and sentencing] is clearly relevant to the content of the colloquy
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a colloquy at sentencing is less rigorous than what is required at
trial, though the Supreme Court has stated that it has increasingly "taken a more pragmatic approach to the waiver questionasking what purposes a lawyer can serve at the particular stage
of the proceedings in question, and what assistance he could provide to an accused at that stage-to determine the scope of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the type of warnings and
procedures that should be required before a waiver of that right
will be recognized." 100
If a reviewing court determines that a purported waiver of
counsel at sentencing was invalid and therefore that a right-tocounsel violation has occurred, the effect of the violation can depend on the particular circumstances of the case. Several courts
have concluded that a deprivation of the right to counsel at sentencing requires an automatic reversal and remand for resentencing in accordance with the structural-defect cases concerning deprivations at trial. These courts have explicitly rejected harmless error as the appropriate standard of review for
right-to-counsel violations at sentencing.
For example, in United States v. Virgil,10 1 the Fifth Circuit, after concluding that the trial court did not conduct a proper colloquy before allowing the defendant to proceed pro se at sentencing, considered whether that violation could be analyzed under
the harmless-error framework.1 02 The court observed that most
cases involving invalid waivers and corresponding right-tocounsel violations occur in the context of trial and that "virtually
all of those cases reverse without ever entertaining the possibility of harmless error."1 0 3 The court then cited Rose v. Clark10 4 and
Penson v. Ohio0 5 for the propositions that harmless-error analysis is inappropriate if the defendant was deprived of his right to
which the court must have with the defendant. It does not, however, eliminate the need
for the district court to make an inquiry sufficient to support a finding that the waiver of
counsel is voluntary, knowing and intelligent.").
100Patterson v. Ill., 487 U.S. 285, 298 (1988); Salerno, 61 F.3d at 219 ("the inquiry at
sentencing need only be tailored to that proceeding and the consequences that may flow
from it.").
101444 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 365 (2006).
102 Id. at 455.
103 Id.
(citing U.S. v. Jones, 421 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 2005)).
104478 U.S. 570 (1986).
105488 U.S. 75 (1988).
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counsel at trial or on appeal, respectively. 106 Importantly, the
court acknowledged that these cases, while establishing a clear
rule of reversal for Sixth Amendment violations at trial, do not
necessarily compel the same result at sentencing.10 7 Nonetheless,
the court concluded that to review right-to-counsel violations at
sentencing any differently than violations at trial would not be
feasible.1 08 The court reasoned that because "sentencing has become more than just a rote exercise in delivering a term of years;
it often entails probation, parole conditions, restitution, and
other penalties," and because the sentencing guidelines "play a
considerable role in determining a defendant's punishment,"
harmless-error analysis was inappropriate to review an invalid
waiver of counsel at sentencing.10 9 Accordingly, the court held
that a right-to-counsel violation resulting from an invalid waiver
of counsel at sentencing is harmful per se. 0
The court in Virgil based its conclusion on the reasoning of a
Third-Circuit case, United States v. Salemo,"' which, after concluding that the record did not support the defendant's purported
waiver of counsel at sentencing, declined to engage in a harmless-error analysis. 1 2 The court began its discussion of the
waiver's invalidity by noting that with regard to the length of the
colloquy, the fact that the case involved sentencing rather than
trial was "clearly relevant."'1 3 The court immediately stressed,
however, that the district court was not excused from examining
the sufficiency of the defendant's purported waiver because of the
444 F.3d at 455-56.
at 456.
108Id. The court stated, "we see only imperfect ways of drawing a line between the two
[situations of trial and sentencing]." It buttressed its holding by stating, "[i]f a court's error in denying counsel at trial, see U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984), and on appeal,
Penson, 488 U.S. at 88, cannot be rehabilitated with harmless error analysis, we fail to
see how at sentencing this type of Farettaerror, which is the functional equivalent of improperly proceeding without any counsel, can be reviewed for harmless error." Id.
106 Virgil,
107 Id.

109 Virgil, 444 F.3d at 456.

110Id. In reaching its holding, the court overruled Richardson v. Lucas, 741 F.2d 753
(5th Cir. 1984), which held that the deprivation of the defendant's right to counsel at trial
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 757. The Ninth Circuit had predicted that
the Fifth Circuit would follow in the footsteps of the Tenth Circuit in reconsidering
Richardson in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Penson. See Cordova v. Baca, 346
F.3d 924, 928-28 (9th Cir. 2003); see also U.S. v. Gipson, 693 F.2d 109, 112 (10th Cir.
1982), overruled by U.S. v. Allen, 895 F.2d 1577, 1579-80 (10th Cir. 1990).
M 61 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1001 (1995).
112Id. at 221.
113Id. at 219.
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127

posture of the case, and concluded that a deprivation of counsel
114
had occurred.
Turning to the issue of remedy, the court noted that "sentencing is a critical and often time complicated part of the criminal
process that contains subtleties which may be beyond the appreciation of the average layperson." 115 The court detailed the complex nature of the sentencing guidelines, providing examples of
how a defendant could suffer without the assistance of a trained
counsel.1 16 Against this backdrop, the court concluded that a remand for resentencing was required. 11 7 The court "decline[d] to
engage in harmless error analysis"11 8 on account of the right to
counsel's status as "one of the most fundamental and cherished
rights guaranteed by the Constitution."' 19 The court cited a previous case, United States v. Welty,120 that had, in turn, cited
Chapman for the proposition that a violation of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel can never be treated as harmless error.1 21 Based on this reasoning, the court determined that "the
deprivation of the defendant's right to representation at sentencing under the circumstances of this case [did not justify] a harm22
less error analysis."'
In his concurrence, then-Judge Alito took issue with the portion of the majority's opinion that declined to engage in a harmless-error analysis.12 3 Judge Alito expressed his concern that the
majority's opinion would be interpreted more broadly than in cirId.
115 Id. at 220.
114

116 Id. at 220-21 (noting in the examples the sentencing court's ability to consider conduct that did not result in conviction and the potential for an inadvertent waiver of posttrial arguments). Id. at 220; see, e.g., Howard v. U.S., 374 F.3d 1068, 1072-73 (11th Cir.
2004) (stating that a prisoner's claim can be procedurally barred in a habeas proceeding
where he failed to challenge the use of prior conviction to enhance sentence at sentencing
hearing); Elzy v. U.S., 205 F.3d 882, 884 (6th Cir. 2000) (concluding that the failure to
raise breach-of-plea-agreement claim at sentencing constituted waiver of that claim in
collateral proceeding); Reid v. U.S., 976 F.2d 446, 448 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that prisoner's failure to object at sentencing and on appeal to district court's alleged violations of
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure constituted procedural default at postconviction proceeding), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 945 (1993).
117 Salerno, 61 F.3d at 221.
118 Id.

Id. at 222.
F.2d 185 (3d Cir. 1982).
121 Salerno, 61 F.3d at 222.
122 Id. (emphasis added).
123 Salerno, 61 F.3d at 222-23 (Alito, J., concurring).
119

120 674
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cumstances similar to the instant case, as the court had relied on
cases involving deprivations of the right to counsel at trial "that
strongly suggest that the deprivation of counsel can never be
harmless. ' 124 Judge Alito posited that the majority opinion could
be interpreted as meaning that a violation of the right to counsel
at sentencing could never be subject to harmless-error analysis.125 In a footnote, Judge Alito envisioned a scenario in which a
defendant did not validly waive counsel but still received the
mandatory minimum sentence as an example of where an automatic remand would be unnecessary.1 26 Judge Alito cautioned
that the cases relied upon by the majority involved deprivations
of counsel at trial and expressed a desire to leave open the question of whether those cases' rationale should extend to the sentencing context.1 27 Ultimately, Judge Alito expressed no precise
opinion with regard to whether the deprivation of the right to
counsel at sentencing could be subject to harmless-error analysis.

12 8

In an earlier case, Golden v. Newsome, 129 the Eleventh Circuit,
after concluding that the defendant did not waive his right to
counsel at sentencing by escaping custody, considered whether
the resulting deprivation could be considered harmless error.13 0
The court began its analysis by noting that the right to counsel at
critical stages of the criminal process had been established as a
fundamental right, but then noted that while Golden had been
deprived of his right to counsel, he had, in any event, received a
sentence within the statutory range for his conviction. 131 The
court stated, however, that "the Supreme Court has made it
abundantly clear that even though a defendant has no substantive right to a particular sentence within the range authorized by
statute, the total denial of counsel at a critical stage such as sentencing is presumptively prejudicial and is not to be deemed
124Id.
125

at 223.

Id.

126Id.

at 223 n.6.
at 223 ("[It may well be that these precedents should be extended to govern the
deprivation of counsel at sentencing, but neither the Supreme Court nor this court has yet
done so, and I think that such an extension would warrant careful analysis.").
128 Salerno, 61 F.3d at 224 (Alito, J., concurring).
129 755 F.2d 1478 (11th Cir. 1985).
130Id. at 1483-84.
131 Id. at 1483.
127 Id.
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harmless error." 132 Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence
and remanded for a new hearing. 133 But in a footnote, the court
recognized what it described as an "obviousE" exception to its
holding: "[W]here the precise sentence for a particular offense is
mandatorily fixed by law such that its imposition is merely a
ministerial ceremony, with no discretion to be exercised by the
sentencing judge, the absence of counsel at such a proceeding
could not possibly be prejudicial. In that rare and narrow circumstance, the legal presumption of prejudice due to the absence
34
of counsel would not apply."'
Two years after Golden, the Ninth Circuit briefly considered
harmless-error review of an invalid waiver at sentencing in
United States v. Balough.135 In that case, the defendant pleaded
guilty but later filed pro se motions to withdraw his guilty plea
and to proceed without the assistance of counsel. 136 The district
court granted the defendant's motion to proceed pro se and then
conducted the hearing concerning the motion to withdraw the
guilty plea. 137 The court denied the motion to withdraw the plea
and the defendant subsequently represented himself at sentencing. 138 The court of appeals concluded that the defendant had not
adequately waived his right to counsel at the hearing on the pro
se motion and then considered whether harmless-error analysis
39
could apply to that violation.
The court determined that harmless-error review was inappropriate because the defendant was denied his right to counsel at
both the hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and at
the sentencing hearing. 140 In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on Supreme Court cases stating that a defendant has a right
to counsel at every stage of criminal proceedings where substantial rights may be affected and that harmless-error review pre-

132 Id.

(citing U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984); Chapman v. Cal., 386 U.S. 18, 23

n.8 (1967)).
133 Id.
at 1484.
Id. at 1484 n.9 (citing Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 1965)).
135820 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1987).
134

136Id.

at
at
38
1
Id. at
139Id. at
140Id. at
137Id.

1486.
1486-87.
1487.
1489.
1490.
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supposes that the defendant was represented by counsel. 14 1 Balough therefore provided support for the proposition that the
deprivation of the right to counsel at sentencing requires automatic reversal, although the fact that the defendant was also denied the right at his plea-withdrawal hearing distinguished the
case from Virgil and Salerno.
Against this backdrop, in Crawford the Eighth Circuit concluded that neither a colloquy nor the record as a whole supported the finding of a valid waiver of counsel prior to sentencing
and then considered whether that violation could be subject to
harmless-error analysis. 142 The court began by observing that
dictum from a previous case could arguably support the application of the harmless-error doctrine. In that case, after concluding
that the defendant had validly waived his righu to counsel, the
court stated, "[T]here is nothing in the record to suggest that further delay and a fourth appointed counsel would have produced a
different sentence."' 43 The court in Crawford therefore reasoned
that the "lack of prejudice suffered by [Crawford] could be relevant" to determining whether reversal was automatically required. 44 The court then reviewed previous cases that had considered the issue, including Virgil, Salemo, Balough, and Golden,
and also noted the Tenth Circuit's holding in United States v.Allen 45 that harmless-error review was not appropriate for waiver146
of-counsel cases.
The court narrowed its focus to the specific circumstances of
Crawford's case and held that in the "unique circumstance"
where the trial court "lacked the authority to impose a more lenient sentence that the defendant received," harmless-error review
was appropriate. 147 The court expressly limited its holding to that
"limited circumstance," reasoning that Crawford could not show
any resulting prejudice from the deprivation of counsel on account of the trial court's inability to impose a lighter sentence. 48
14 See U.S. v. Balough, 820 F.2d 1485, 1490 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Rose v. Clark, 478
U.S. 570, 578 (1986)).
142 U.S. V. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1101, 1107 (8th Cir. 2007).
143 U.S. v. Day, 998 F.2d 622, 627 (8th Cir. 1993).
144 See Crawford, 487 F.3d at 1107.
145 895 F.2d 1577, 1580 (10th Cir. 1990).
146 See Crawford, 487 F.3d at 1107-08.
147 Id. at 1108.
148 See id.
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The court rejected Crawford's argument that an attorney could
have "taken advantage of the discretion available to courts after
United States v. Booker,"149 because Booker did not affect statutory sentences. 150 The court concluded that there was "nothing
any attorney could have done to achieve a more favorable result
15 1
at sentencing."
Crawford thus represents, to a certain extent, a departure
from Virgil, Salemo, and Balough, and an explicit endorsement of
the footnote in Golden and Judge Alito's concurrence in Salemo.
As the court in Crawford made clear, however, that departure
was owing to the very unique circumstances of Crawford's case.
IV. THE LIMITED ROLE OF HARMLESS-ERROR REVIEW IN
DEPRIVATION-OF-COUNSEL CASES

The foregoing cases indicate that the rule of automatic reversal
fits nearly all deprivation-of-counsel cases. In the context of
trial, it is impossible to quantify the amount of prejudice suffered
by a defendant who is not represented by licensed counsel.1 52 An
attorney is not only familiar with procedural and evidentiary
rules but also makes strategic decisions over the course of a trial
that a layperson likely would not consider. 15 3 It is similarly an
exercise in futility to speculate as to what issues an attorney
would have identified, much less meaningfully argued, during
the pendency of an appeal. 154 And during the course of a normal
sentencing hearing in federal court, where the judge considers
whether to grant departures or variances and weighs various fac155
tors in calculating the recommended range of imprisonment,
149 543 U.S. 220 (2005); see also Gall v. United States, __ U.S. -,
128 S. Ct. 586
(2007) (holding that under Booker, an appellate court may only review a district court's
sentence for an abuse of discretion).
150See Crawford, 487 F.3d at 1108 (citing U.S. v. Rojas-Coria, 401 F.3d 871, 874 n.4
(8th Cir. 2005)); see also U.S. v. Gregg, 451 F.3d 930, 937 (8th Cir. 2006) ("Booker does not
relate to statutorily-imposed sentences.").
151Crawford, 487 F.3d at 1108.
152 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
153 Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized the impossibility of assessing prejudice
where the defendant is merely denied his choice of counsel (as opposed the complete denial of any counsel) on account of the possibility that "[d]ifferent attorneys will pursue
different strategies with regard to investigation and discovery, development of the theory
of defense, selection of the jury, presentation of the witnesses, and style of witness examination and jury argument." U.S. v. Gonzales-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2564 (2006).
154See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88 (1988).
155 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (West 2000).
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the arguments that an attorney may advance, particularly in this
post-Booker era, are too numerous and too speculative to readily
156
reconstruct on appellate review.
Accordingly, the rule of automatic reversal appears to be the
proper remedy for any right-to-counsel violation-no matter
which stage of the criminal process is involved. But, this rule it
is not necessarily appropriate for every case. In a rare case,
common sense and concerns of economy can-and shouldtriumph over the fundamental right to counsel. Crawford presented the first concrete example of such a case.
Ostensibly, Crawford was a unique mixture of facts and law
that produced a narrow holding-a sui generis case. Upon closer
review, however, Crawford raised broader questions concerning
appellate review of Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel violations
at sentencing. Most notably, the absolute prohibition against
harmless-error review articulated in Virgil, Salemo, and Balough
should be reexamined in light of the potential for extraordinary
cases like Crawford. Additionally, extreme cases like Crawford
should force courts to consider whether a fundamental right can
ever be trumped by concerns of efficiency and practicality. In order to make such a judgment, these courts must consider
whether any counsel could have possibly assisted a defendant or
whether that assertion is belied by the facts of the case.
These questions need only be considered in unusual cases,
however, as Crawford will not (and should not) change the manner in which courts review right-to-counsel violations that occur
at sentencing. The rule of automatic reversal is still the standard for nearly all deprivations of the right to counsel, and Crawford is only a unique exception to that general rule.1 57 The rule of
166 See generally MOORE ET AL., supra note 85,
632.20 (detailing the numerous considerations in determining a sentence under the guidelines); see also Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 58798.
157 The rule of automatic reversal was recently applied by the Supreme Court in a dif-

ferent context than a right-to-counsel violation at sentencing. In U.S. v. Gonzalez-Lopez,
the Court, after determining that the defendant had been denied his choice of counsel at
trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment, considered whether that violation could be reviewed for harmless error. 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2563 (2006). The Court reviewed its trial error/structural error dichotomy and ultimately had "little trouble concluding that erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice, 'with consequences that are necessarily
unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably qualifies as structural error."' Id. at
2564 (citation omitted). Because "[i]t is impossible to know what different choices the rejected counsel would have made, and then to quantify the impact of those different choices
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automatic reversal and the reasoning that underlies it will still
encourage-if not explicitly direct-courts to order new sentencing hearings where defendants are denied counsel at sentencing.
But as Crawford illustrates, the rule of automatic reversal does
not necessarily fit every deprivation case. Crawford is the first
case in which a court has held that a right-to-counsel violation at
sentencing may be reviewed for harmless error,15 8 and whether
other courts are willing to consider applying harmless-error review to deprivation cases will depend on whether sufficient similarities exist between the facts of Crawford and future cases. In
those cases, courts will encounter the same core issue that the
deprivation-at-sentencing cases have considered.
The broad question that the courts in Virgil, Salemo, Balough,
Golden, and Crawford each addressed is whether harmless-error
review could ever be appropriate for examining right-to-counsel
violations that occur at sentencing. As part of this inquiry, these
courts were invited to consider whether any counsel could have
made a positive difference for the defendant at re-sentencing.
The Virgil, Salerno, and Balough courts each refused to engage in
such review, while the court in Golden acknowledged that a
unique situation may exist, and Crawford in turn presented that
situation. The Crawford court narrowly circumscribed its holding, 159 and this scenario may prove to be the only circumstance in
which harmless-error review is appropriate for right-to-counsel
violations. Even this limited holding, however, required the
court to make a value judgment that previous courts had not.
Driving the court's decision in Crawford was the triumph of
practicality and efficiency over form. Despite the strong language in cases describing the deprivation of counsel as unquantifiable, in the case of some deprivations, the resulting harm can
actually be measured. In Crawford, the defendant received the
mandatory minimum sentence. Therefore, there was no question
on the outcome of the proceedings," the Court concluded that harmless-error review was
inappropriate for that violation. Id. at 2465.
158
The court's statement in Golden was dictum, 755 F.2d at 1483 n.9, and Judge-Alito's
concurrence was not joined by his colleagues, U.S. v. Salerno, 61 F.3d 214, 222 (3d Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1001 (1995).
159 U.S. v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1101, 1108 (8th Cir. 2007). "[W]e limit our holding to the
unique circumstance presented here: when the district court lacked the authority to impose a more lenient sentence than the defendant received ...we agree with the Eleventh
Circuit that harmless error review is appropriate." Id.
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that Crawford would have been no better off with representation
at resentencing. In cases like this, where the effect (or lack
thereof) of the deprivation can be readily assessed, courts should
embrace harmless-error review.
Courts are unlikely to undertake this analysis for several reasons, however. First, the facts of Crawford are so unique that a
comparable case will not often arise. Second, even if courts are
presented with a similar scenario as that in Crawford, they may
remain reluctant to discount all possible benefits of representation. For example, courts may posit that while an attorney-or
for that matter a judge-cannot avoid the application of a mandatory minimum statute, there does exist the possibility for a
truly exceptional argument. Indeed, lawyers are ethically obligated to represent their clients zealously, within the bounds of
frivolity. 160 Building on this concept, Crawford argued on appeal
that his sentencing counsel could have challenged the validity of
the mandatory sentencing scheme, but the court dismissed that
hypothetical as insufficient to avoid harmless-error analysis in
light of clear precedent to the contrary.
But what if Crawford's hypothetical sentencing counsel would
have challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum
statute? Or if she would have asserted that the government
should have filed a motion on account of substantial assistance? 161 These types of uncertainties justified the decisions in
Virgil, Salemo, and Balough not to engage in harmless-error
analysis. Those courts adhered to the rule of automatic reversal
that is rooted in cases involving deprivations of counsel at trial,
but as Crawford illustrates, this bright-line rule is not necessarily appropriate in all contexts. The defendant's arguments in
Crawford did not warrant a new hearing before the district court,
as the simple consideration of judicial economy compelled a
common-sense result. This is not to say that the fundamental
right to counsel should be balanced against institutional consid160 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (2002). In federal court, if
counsel believes that an appeal is frivolous, the court is satisfied that counsel has conducted a diligent investigation into potential arguments, and the court agrees with counsel's evaluation, then counsel may withdraw from a case. See Anders v. Cal., 386 U.S. 738,
741-42 (1967).
161A district court may review the government's decision not to move for a substantialassistance departure if the refusal was based on an unconstitutional motive or not rationally related to any legitimate end. Wade v. U.S., 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992).

2008]

JUDICAL REVIEWOFRIGHT-TO-COUNSEL VIOLATIONS

135

erations as a matter of course, but in a unique case like Crawford, adherence to the trial rule of automatic reversal would have
truly represented an exercise in form over substance.
Still, in addition to adherence to the rule of automatic reversal,
appellate courts may be reluctant to describe a sentencing judge's
role as "ministerial"162 as justification for the use of harmlesserror review. A federal sentencing hearing is virtually certain to
involve a calculation of the appropriate guidelines range, including the assignment of criminal history points and the determination of a total offense level; the consideration of whether to grant
upward or downward departures or variances; an analysis of the
factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); a consideration of whether the sentence is reasonable; the application of mandatory minimum or
maximum statutes; or an argument that the sentence is unconstitutional (e.g., cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment). 163 Accordingly, judges and commentators
have been more inclined to describe the federal sentencing guidelines as complex, confusing, and even "almost incomprehensible" 164 than as simple or ministerial. 165 Considering this inherent
complexity in any sentencing hearing, appellate courts may decline to assume that any result, even involving a mandatory
minimum statute, is unchangeable with the assistance of counsel
at rehearing. Thus, courts may continue to use the rule of automatic reversal to avoid a calculation of prejudice, no matter how
unavailing a defendant's arguments may appear.
Nonetheless, the doctrine of harmless error can play a role, albeit minor, in deprivation-of-counsel cases. Cases like Crawford-where a defendant could not possibly have achieved a better result at sentencing, even with representation-should be
reviewed for harmless error despite the existence of a Sixth
Amendment violation. This approach would embody the purposes of harmless-error review, including the need to avoid duplicative litigation and the waste of judicial resources. It would also
Golden, 755 F.2d at 1483.
generally MOORE ET AL., supra note 85, 632.20.
164U.S. v. Smith, 997 F.2d 396, 399 (8th Cir. 1993) (Bright, J., dissenting).
165See id. (describing the then-mandatory guidelines as "exceedingly opaque" and making it "nearly impossible to sentence offenders in a straightforward and equitable manner"); Cris Carmody, Sentencing Overload Hits the Circuits, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 5, 1993, at 32
(quoting a description of the guidelines as an 'incredibly insane, complicated system"').
162 See
163See
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foster public confidence in a system that is often criticized for
prolonged appeals and burdensome, protracted litigation.
CONCLUSION

Appellate courts have vigilantly protected defendants' right to
counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process, including
sentencing, by applying the rule of automatic reversal. While the
institutional considerations underlying the doctrine of harmlesserror review should not outweigh the importance of protecting
this fundamental right, in certain situations, courts should tailor
their review to reflect the unique circumstances of the given case.
The rule of automatic reversal is indeed the standard remedy in
deprivation-of-counsel cases, but the doctrine of harmless-error
review can sometimes play a role as well.

